I just had a quick read through of the Startup Genome report. The ambition level and aims of the team are commendable. But I was disappointed by the substance. I would like to make it clear that I respect the endeavour immensely and would certainly like to see a more robust reporting of the findings. Maybe concentrating on just a couple of the points the list as their 14 key findings would make it even more valuable. I also respect getting Steve Blank to launch it with this article.
As a disclaimer, having written my Master’s dissertation on the topic of using evolutionary analogies in the social sciences, I hope you’ll understand I’ll take a pretty critical view to anything claiming to map the genome of anything above the level of biology.
First of all, you have to remember this is survey report. Surveys are inherently flawed in selection bias, and this issue should always be addressed in any report claiming findings based on a survey. Based on the description on their blog, it is impossible to say how large this bias has potentially been. To put this simplistically, if you survey startups about success, are you sure you are including the failed ones in the first place? Maybe they tackled this. Here is a long post on analysis methodology. But the most important disclaimer would be the data gathering description.
The high-level points are good reminders of some of the things that are important. I’ll go through their 14 key points here.
1. Founders that learn are more successful: Startups that have helpful mentors, track metrics effectively, and learn from startup thought leaders raise 7x more money and have 3.5x better user growth.
Startups that follow success stories and learn from them are likelier to succeed. Sounds pretty good, if a bit obvious. Also, without exact methodology, the numbers mean very little. Also notice that the survey includes both very very early stage startups, and companies that have been developing their product and their company for a long time. In the longer run, it is likelier that you read and follow more of what happens in your field, and it also likelier that you are getting funding, since you have survived (yes, notice the tautology).
2. Startups that pivot once or twice times raise 2.5x more money, have 3.6x better user growth, and are 52% less likely to scale prematurely than startups that pivot more than 2 times or not at all.
This is certainly pretty open to interpretation. What is a pivot, anyway? At what point? If you change your idea twice during the first week, did you use up your pivots? Another way of saying this is: If you can’t adapt, you fail. If you lack focus, you fail.
3. Many investors invest 2-3x more capital than necessary in startups that haven’t reached problem solution fit yet. They also over-invest in solo founders and founding teams without technical cofounders despite indicators that show that these teams have a much lower probability of success.
It would very interesting to see how this changes over time and over economic conditions. No, I won’t mention the b-word.
4. Investors who provide hands-on help have little or no effect on the company’s operational performance. But the right mentors significantly influence a company’s performance and ability to raise money. (However, this does not mean that investors don’t have a significant effect on valuations and M&A)
This sounds interesting. But this needs to be opened much more, since hands-on help is not a hard-and-fast data point, and can vary from individual to individual greatly. Another explanation for this is that there is just too much noise in interpreting this that it looks exactly the same.
5. Solo founders take 3.6x longer to reach scale stage compared to a founding team of 2 and they are 2.3x less likely to pivot.
Not surprised, but given the concerns about the methodology and terminology, the numbers are pretty meaningless.
6. Business-heavy founding teams are 6.2x more likely to successfully scale with sales driven startups than with product centric startups.
Not surprised.
7. Technical-heavy founding teams are 3.3x more likely to successfully scale with product-centric startups with no network effects than with product-centric startups that have network effects.
Not surprised. Another way of saying the above points is that you should do what you are good at. The learnings about core competence are nothing new.
8. Balanced teams with one technical founder and one business founder raise 30% more money, have 2.9x more user growth and are 19% less likely to scale prematurely than technical or business-heavy founding teams.
Great! Sounds like most of the opinions of traditional VCs and incubators about ideal teams.
9. Most successful founders are driven by impact rather than experience or money.
That they want to make something big happen? Awesome, I agree.
10. Founders overestimate the value of IP before product market fit by 255%.
Ok. How do they know what the actual value of IP is, against which the 255% is calculated? I would definitely need more data, or will continue to take this with a massive chunk of salt. Also notice that even if this was exactly true, it would still be enough in the ballpark for an estimate to be pretty good. It is not off by an order of magnitude.
11. Startups need 2-3 times longer to validate their market than most founders expect. This underestimation creates the pressure to scale prematurely.
A resounding yes! Notice though they say “validate”. Do you know exactly when you validate your market, or is that something you will realize after the validation happens, and has itself been validated, and has maybe survived an invalidation… you get the point. It is a moving target. But yeah, things tend to take longer than you expect them to.
12. Startups that haven’t raised money over-estimate their market size by 100x and often misinterpret their market as new.
I would love to know how many of these unfunded startups are teams who have actually worked on the company for over 3 months full time.
13. Premature scaling is the most common reason for startups to perform worse. They tend to lose the battle early on by getting ahead of themselves.
This is a golden nugget of wisdom and should certainly be opened more. Please, please research this more.
14. B2C vs. B2B is not a meaningful segmentation of Internet startups anymore because the Internet has changed the rules of business. We found 4 different major groups of startups that all have very different behavior regarding customer acquisition, time, product, market and team.
Yeah. But we tend to not do a hard division of businesses anymore anyway. Business-to-user or self-service B2B are flavours of companies between the hard borders of B2B and B2C.
Additionally, I am not a big fan of their “Marmer stages” (pretty gutsy naming them after the main author, well done there), as descriptive as they are. Here is the justification:
“We attempt to provide that evidence for the existence of the Marmer Stages int wo ways:1) The Marmer Stages correlate with traditional indicators of progress. 2) Startups that don’t move through the stages consistently, show less progress.”
How does that prove the existence of something new if it correlates with traditional progress indicators (which themselves are validated by #2)? This sounds like repackaging more than discovery.
There is more in the report, and like I said, the things they bring up are good reminders. There just isn’t that much news in it.
This post was originally posted on Marketing Sense. Go there to stay on top of my marketing-related posts.